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As policy-makers and analysts become more distant from momentous global events, they tend to invoke a sentence or phrase to encapsulate what these moments mean and what lessons they carry. After World War II, the primary frame was the聽鈥渄anger of聽appeasement鈥澨共曰逄�渘o more聽Munichs鈥�; after the genocide in Rwanda, the lesson was聽鈥渘ever聽again鈥澛燼nd the聽鈥渇ailure of the West to聽intervene."
But how do we arrive at such distilled narratives and soundbites from events as complex as war or genocide? Looking back at both of these examples, it鈥檚 clear that particular representations develop over time, becoming dominant as certain lessons are contested or fade away. In short, the lessons policy-makers draw aren鈥檛 always immediately obvious or inevitable, but the product of political and social discourse over time.
Twenty-five years from now, what聽will聽our聽shorthand be for the war in Afghanistan?聽There are at least聽four聽potential聽representations of the intervention, war, and Western withdrawal that are聽circulating in current discourse聽鈥� each of which is worth challenging before it becomes crystallized as the dominant lesson聽for future policy-makers聽to draw on.聽
Narrative #1: Doomed to聽Fail聽
The first narrative is that the 20-year effort of NATO听补苍诲听the United States聽was聽a tragic venture, as it was bound聽to fail.聽Two reasons are usually given for this shorthand聽assessment. The first,聽, is that the very political DNA of the United States 鈥� its聽democratic system聽and processes聽鈥� simply cannot sustain a military engagement overseas, given the difficulty聽of聽setting clear, narrow and attainable goals.聽There will always be the temptation for loftier objectives, such as 鈥榙efeating communism鈥� (as in Vietnam) or bringing about democratic transformation (as in Afghanistan). The second reason聽supporting the narrative of inevitable failure is that 鈥榦rdinary鈥� Afghans simply did not have the will to fight聽to the end for a new political system for their country. Therefore, once the support of an external power was withdrawn, the military effort against the Taliban and聽in support of the secular government in Kabul was destined to crumble.
But does this representation of tragic venture really hold up? Some analysts (including Kissinger himself) suggest that in 2001 the United States, supported by other Western states, could have set the more specific goal of rooting out terrorist movements in Afghanistan 鈥� and sustained it with appropriate levels of force and creative diplomacy. Instead, US resources and strategic focus became diverted by the dangerous effort to unseat Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and by a military strategy in Afghanistan that created an insurgency. By pushing the idea of inevitable failure, we therefore absolve US and other Western decision-makers of responsibility for the particular policy choices they made. We ignore that there were critical junctures, at which different paths could have been pursued.聽
Moreover, this first narrative grossly misrepresents the sacrifices made by so many Afghans. Over 66,000 members of the Afghan armed forces lost their lives in the post-9/11 period, along with close to 50,000 Afghan civilians. Others invested sweat and tears in building up new state institutions or in creating new civil society organizations. These numbers do not cohere with the message that Afghans lacked the will to fight for a different future.聽聽
Narrative #2: Don't meddle in foreign conflicts
The second narrative or lesson dominating public discourse 鈥� the one President Biden currently prefers 鈥� is that 鈥渢he United States should not get involved in other countries鈥� civil wars鈥�. This is a striking inversion of the lesson the US claimed it had learned from the Rwandan genocide. The problem with this representation is that it depicts a country whose borders could and should have been impenetrable to outsiders, and that the choice facing the United States in 2001 was whether to become involved in Afghanistan鈥檚 sovereign jurisdiction.聽聽
The reality, however, is that Afghanistan has really never been left to its own devices. It has long been penetrated from all sides聽鈥斅燩akistan to the east and south, Iran to the west, and Russia via various proxies.聽Moreover, US interference throughout the 1980s as a form of聽counter-intervention聽to Soviet involvement facilitated the Taliban鈥檚 eventual rise and changed the country鈥檚 political trajectory. The insurgency of the post-2001 period,聽, was largely made by the United States. But more importantly, the US, along with other powers with interests in the region, have employed many ways and means of trying to influence developments in Afghanistan (and elsewhere), even without boots on the ground.聽聽
Narrative #3: Full Circle聽/ Square One聽
A third representation of Afghanistan that dominates today鈥檚 discourse is聽that聽鈥渨e're back to where we started鈥�. Afghanistan has come聽full circle.聽The Taliban are back in power and聽theocratic rule will grip聽the country聽yet again.聽聽
This narrative聽is worth poking and prodding. To begin, the Afghan population has changed significantly since 2001. An entire generation聽鈥撀爌articularly of women and girls聽鈥撀爃as lived under a different form of government. It would be surprising if its priorities, and its stance towards its new leaders, were exactly the same as they were two decades ago.聽Similarly, we should not assume that the Taliban will function as a replica of its 2001 self.聽聽
To be sure, there are deeply worrying signs about the authenticity of Taliban leaders鈥� promises to govern with moderation. Reports suggest that Taliban figures are resorting to extreme and public forms of punishment for crime; cracking down with force on local journalists; denying freedoms and services to women; and forcibly displacing minority communities. The Taliban should be judged by its actions and not its words, and should be held accountable for any crimes or atrocities that it commits.聽聽
At the same time, the organization has forged different alliances and connections with outside actors.聽The configuration of its foreign support base is not the same as it was in 2001.聽The political economy of its rule has聽also聽shifted.聽Whereas in the earlier phases of its rule, Taliban leaders and commanders secured revenue by taxing activities that were occurring in their zones of control (including farmers and drug producers), today they are much more deeply engaged in the drug trade 鈥� including in trafficking and exporting 鈥� and can draw on the resources and institutions of the Afghan state to engage in illicit activities. All of these changes聽must be聽analyzed聽and understood in any political and diplomatic attempts to provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan population, or to try to聽influence or聽moderate Taliban behaviour.聽
A final problem with the聽鈥渇ull聽circle鈥澛爎epresentation is that it doesn鈥檛 capture the degree to which the United States has changed as global power since 2001.聽At the turn of the millennium, it was the unrivalled superpower. Vladimir Putin was in the early years of his presidency and had not yet embarked on his campaign to reassert Russia鈥檚 power and influence and openly challenge the West. China had not yet flexed its muscles as the rising hegemon or聽directly confronted US and Western ambitions in the UN Security Council.聽聽
The global landscape of 2021 is marked by a very different distribution of hard power, and a significant waning of US soft power.聽The day before President Biden鈥檚 August 31 deadline for withdrawal, the UN Security Council passed a watered-down resolution that would have provided a safe corridor for humanitarian assistance into Afghanistan and safe passage for those seeking to leave. Both China and Russia worked to weaken that resolution as part of a broader effort to limit the influence of Western countries on multilateral humanitarian efforts.聽聽
During聽that聽Security Council debate,聽China鈥檚 Permanent Representative to the United Nations,聽Zhang Jun, delivered a diplomatic but hard-hitting rebuke of the聽hurried聽Western聽exit聽and its potential to destabilize both Afghanistan and the wider region. In so doing, he also adroitly positioned his country as the defender and guardian of international order: 鈥淲e hope that the relevant countries will realize the fact that withdrawal is not the end of responsibility, but the beginning of reflection and correction.鈥澛燭his is one narrative that Western countries are quickly losing control over.聽
Narrative #4:聽We are already doing our part
China鈥檚 reference to聽responsibility brings me to the final narrative contending for dominance in today鈥檚 discourse on Afghanistan 鈥� the idea that聽the best way for聽Western countries聽to聽now聽fulfill their responsibility is through the resettlement of Afghan refugees. Canada, in particular, is heralding its promise to bring 40,000 Afghans to this country,聽聽at the UN General Assembly in late September.聽
While the resettlement pledge has been widely praised, the details of how the process will聽actually聽work is still聽opaque聽to many Afghans, as well as Canadians who want to help. But more importantly, the target numbers represent only a sliver of the Afghan population. What about the millions of who remain, in a situation of deepening humanitarian crisis?聽聽
In late October,聽聽that more than 50% of the country鈥檚 population 鈥� approximately 23 million 鈥� are now confronting acute food insecurity. 3.5 million of them are children. And this in a context where the country is already facing its worst drought in three decades.聽
The narrative that our responsibility is exercised through refugee resettlement is dangerously narrow. It denies that the actions of foreign countries have had a profound impact on Afghanistan鈥檚 future and the security and livelihoods of its people. It legitimizes a conception of responsibility that extends only to particular individuals who Western countries are able to extract and聽鈥渟ave鈥�.聽聽
Open Questions聽
Narrative #4 also diverts us from confronting聽two fundamental questions聽that are crucial moving forward.聽聽
The first is what NATO countries are prepared to do if and when Afghans start fleeing聽en聽masse, in order to avoid the fate of starvation. Already, Canada鈥檚 European allies are wrestling with this possibility. In so doing,聽they聽are invoking another historical precedent: the 2015 migration of Syrian refugees across the European continent.聽聽
The second, and really tough question, is whether and how we are prepared to engage with the Taliban.聽Millions of dollars in development assistance have been frozen, due to concerns about directly dealing with Afghanistan鈥檚 new rulers. Are we willing to re-purpose it for humanitarian aid? If so, through what processes and under what conditions?聽
There are no easy answers. But policy-makers will be only be able to confront these questions, and others, if they resist the temptation to frame the last two decades of Western involvement in Afghanistan with a simple soundbite.聽
About the author
Jennifer M. Welsh is the Canada 150 Research Chair in Global Governance and Security at 平特五不中. She was previously Professor and Chair in International Relations at the European University Institute (Florence, Italy) and Professor in International Relations at the University of Oxford, where she co-founded the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict. From 2013-2016, she served as the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, on the Responsibility to Protect.
Professor Welsh is the author, co-author, and editor of several books and articles on humanitarian intervention, the evolution of the notion of the 鈥榬esponsibility to protect鈥� in international society, the UN Security Council, and Canadian foreign policy. Her most recent books include聽The Return of History: Conflict, Migration and Geopolitics in the 21st century聽(2016), which was based on her CBC Massey Lectures, and聽The Responsibility to Prevent: Overcoming the Challenges of Atrocity Prevention聽(2015). She was a former recipient of a Leverhulme Trust Research Fellowship and a Trudeau Fellowship, and from 2014-2019 has directed a five-year European Research Council-funded project called 鈥淭he Individualisation of War: Reconfiguring the Ethics, Law and Politics of Armed Conflict鈥�. She is also a frequent media commentator on international affairs and Canadian foreign policy.
Professor Welsh sits on the editorial boards of the journals聽Global Responsibility to Protect, International Journal,听补苍诲听Ethics and International Affairs, and on the Advisory Boards of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, and the Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation. She has a BA from the University of Saskatchewan (Canada), and a Masters and Doctorate from the University of Oxford (where she studied as a Rhodes Scholar).
