The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) has been hailed by some as an important step forward for a global refugee protection system under severe strain.[1] Others however, have dismissed it as 鈥渃op out鈥 or missed opportunity, primarily for its inability to overhaul the international refugee protection system coming under severe pressure as it struggles to respond to the humanitarian and protection needs of staggering numbers of displaced people, approximately 25 million of whom are refugees.[2] With 181 member states of the UN General Assembly voting in favour, two states voting against and three states abstaining, it was adopted on the 17th of December 2018.[3] Its objectives: to ease pressure on refugee host countries; enhance refugees鈥 self reliance; expand access to third country solutions, and support conditions in the countries of origin for refugees鈥 return in safety and dignity.[4]
To do so, the Compact reiterates important guiding principles that include, but are not limited to, those enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[5] adopted more than 70 years earlier. Secondly, it offers a comprehensive refugee response framework to assist local and national institutions and communities in the reception and admission of refugees, and fleshes out ways of supporting their ongoing needs in a rapid and well supported manner. Thirdly, it lays out concrete measures that could help countries meet the objectives of the Compact and achieve a more equitable responsibility sharing. Finally, it identifies a set of arrangements for follow up and review and reiterates the need to develop indicators in order to measure the progress made.[6]
Several features of the GCR are promising. Firstly, it reiterates that 鈥淸i]t is grounded in the international refugee protection regime, centred on the cardinal principle of non-refoulement, and at the core of which is the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol.鈥[7] It also underscores that it 鈥渋s guided by relevant international human rights instruments, international humanitarian law, as well as other international instruments as applicable,鈥[8] such as the fundamental right 鈥渢o seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution鈥 (article 14 of the UDHR) as well as those found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other major international human rights treaties.[9] At a time when the global dynamics are characterized by populism, anti-immigration and anti-refugee sentiments, and have been exploited by some states to roll back on their commitments under the 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its Protocol,[10] the GCR represents an important declaration by the international community that it remains committed to promoting and protecting the rights of refugees.[11] And although the Compact remains a non-binding document, 鈥淸a]greements that are not legally binding per se may still reflect important political commitments of states to act in a predictable manner.鈥[12]
Secondly, given that responsibility-sharing remains one of the key challenges to the refugee rights framework; global efforts to tackle it effectively require international solidarity. Arguably, it is through the GCR鈥檚 Global Refugee Forum and its encouragement of the involvement of various stakeholders that it seeks to overcome the failures at collective action that the global refugee regime has suffered from.[13] Importantly, it also underscores that protecting and caring for refugees requires a dedicated effort to address the root causes of conflict, and that doing so must remain of 鈥渟erious concern to the international community as a whole, requiring early efforts to address their drivers and triggers, as well as improved cooperation among political, humanitarian, development and peace actors.鈥[14]
Thirdly, the Compact encourages states to take advantage of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF),[15] initiated under the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in 2016,[16] to establish regional and country specific mechanisms for addressing mass influxes of refugees and to put them in place together with a wide spectrum of partners such as international organizations, local NGOs and the affected refugee communities. Moreover, it calls upon states to announce concrete and voluntary pledges that they seek to achieve, and develop specific ways to transform these pledges into tangible and achievable objectives on the ground.[17] One example of such pledges was made by Ethiopia, which today is one of the most important refugee-hosting countries in the world.[18]
Fourthly, the Compact promises to expand complimentary pathways for admission to third countries, 鈥渨ith a view to increasing significantly their availability and predictability.鈥[19] This will include efforts to secure more private and community sponsorship programmes, two avenues with which Canada has had significant experience. Following the canadian experience of resettling an estimated 40,000 Syrian refugees since 2015, these two sponsorship avenues have been shared with other states as examples of successful models to emulate.[20] Under the GCR, means to expand these pathways include the provision of technical support to states and other stakeholders expanding community resettlement programs. [21] Previous Canadian led efforts to provide such support include a 2016 joint initiative with UNHCR and the Open Society Foundation aimed at increasing private sponsorship of refugees around the world.[22]
Fifthly, UNHCR will be putting in place a mechanism 鈥渇or tracking implementation of pledges and contributions, as well as measuring the impact of the global compact.鈥[23] Together with regular high-level meetings to facilitate stocktaking, they can maintain the momentum and provide a platform to share good practices.[24] While not a new practice in and of itself, the GCR seeks to provide a more robust mechanism for gathering reliable and timely data to identify, plan and implement appropriate solutions.[25]
However, other features of the GCR have fallen short. The most striking is that the Compact remains a soft-law instrument that underscores a symbolic expression of the will of states but not a legally binding one.[26] While resorting to non-binding documents (such as the GCR) can be useful in situations in which states are pushing back against contractual arrangements they have agreed to, it can also provide a promising tool for encouraging states to cooperate with each other, including legally binding principles in a non-binding document risks watering down the mandatory character and normative nature of these principles.[27]
Furthermore, the Compact represents a missed opportunity for developing the law to address the normative gaps that the current refugee protection regime suffers from (such as the weakly institutionalized norm of 鈥榬esponsibility sharing鈥), and to clarify the parameters for that responsibility sharing amongst states, or the extent of it on non-state stakeholders.[29] It also is unclear how the GCR will ease the pressure on countries currently on the frontline of refugees crises, hosting the largest numbers of refugees, such as Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon with regards to Syrian refugees (often as result of geographical proximity).
In addition, while the GCR reiterates that it seeks to achieve its objectives 鈥渢hrough the mobilization of political will,鈥[30] it fails to outline the 鈥榯eeth鈥 through which it intends to hold states accountable, including if they fail to fulfill their pledges.[31] Thus although the word 鈥榩ledges鈥 is mentioned numerously throughout the document, it stresses that these pledges remain voluntary in nature.[32] Consequently, they may have little influence on any efforts to distribute responsibility sharing more equitably amongst states.
A final element of concern is with regards to the GCR鈥檚 objective, of supporting conditions in countries of origin for the repatriation of refugees in safety and dignity, and which 鈥渞emains the preferred solution in the majority of refugee situations.鈥[33] Here, it does not stipulate enough safeguards to ensure that the repatriation of refugees remains voluntary. Nor does it provide means for assessing whether conditions are genuinely safe before refugees are repatriated. More worrisome, it does not mention if and what consequences there will be if states choose to repatriate refugees in 鈥榖ad faith鈥.[34]
In the end, one has to bear in mind that the GCR will not miraculously cure all the challenges facing the global refugee protection regime.[35] Only time will tell how successful the international community will be at developing indicators to measure the implementation of the Compact and how successful these will be in capturing any progress made. It also remains to be seen what influence, if any, the GCR will have on the development and implementation of refugee related legislation and policies at the domestic level of individual States.
In the meantime one thing is clear, which is that academics, civil society and refugee communities must keep up the pressure on States to uphold their international legal commitments, reflected in this document, including through the use of the UN human rights system at the international level and advocacy and legal avenues at the domestic level. Their dedicated effort will ensure that the Compact brings us closer to achieving its objectives and that it will go down in history as a cause for celebration and not as a missed opportunity.
References
[1] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), online: thereafter [GCR full text].
[2] Volker T眉rk, 鈥淭he Promise and Potential of the Global Compact on Refugees,鈥 delivered at the IAFSM Annual Conference (2018) (27 July 2018), online: .
[3] Nathalie Risse, 鈥淯NGA Votes to adopt Global Compact o Refugees,鈥 International Institute for Sustainable Development (18 December 2018), online: . This link and all subsequent links last accessed on 3 March 2019.
[4] GCR full text at para. 7.
[5] GCR full text at para. 5, footnote 5.
[6] UNHCR, 鈥淭he Global Compact for Refugees鈥, online: .
[7] GCR full text at para. 5.
[9] Such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention against Torture. Ibid.
[10] For a full text see UNHCHR, online: .
[11] Jocelyn Perry and Stephanie Schwartz, 鈥淭he Global Compact on Refugees Misses the Mark on Refugee Return,鈥 Refugee Law Initiative (Blog) (21 February 2019), online:
[12] Volker T眉rk and Rebecca Dowd, 鈥淧rotection Gaps,鈥 in the Oxford Handbook on Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, Oxford University Press (2014).
[13] Sarah Deardorff Miller, 鈥淗igh Hopes: The Global Compact for Refugees and Improving Responsibility Sharing,鈥 Refugee Law Initiative (Blog) (27 February 2019), online: .
[14] GCR full text at para. 8.
[15] GCR full text at para. 10. For more information on the CCRF, see UNHCR, online: .
[16] UNHCR, UN General Assembly Resultion (A/RES/71/1) online: .
[17] GCR full text at para. 17. Meltem Ineli-Ciger, 鈥淲ill the Global Compact on Refugees address the Gap in International Refugee Law concerning Burden Sharing,鈥 EJIL: Talk (Blog) (20 June 2018), online: .
[18] UNHCR, 鈥淐omprehensive Refugee Response Framework: The Ethiopia Model,鈥 (Case Study) (2018), online: .
[19] GCR full text at para. 95
[20] Ahmed Hussen, Marie-Claude Bibeau, and Jean-Nicolas Beuze, 芦 Why Canada will lead the Charge on the UN鈥檚 Global Refugee Plan,鈥 Macleans (24 September 2018), online: . See also Government of Canada, 鈥#Welcome Refugees: Key Figures,鈥 (last updated 27 July 2017), online .
[21] GCR full text at paras. 91 and 92.
[22] 鈥淐anada, UNHCR and Open Society Foundation to increase Refugee Resettlement,鈥 (Press Release) (22 September 2016), online:
[23] GCR full text at para. 102.
[24] GCR full text at para. 103 and 104.
[25] GCR full text at paras. 45-48.
[26] Maria Gavouneli, 鈥淟egislating by Compacts? The Legal Nature of the Global Compacts,鈥 EJIL: Talk (Blog) (28 February 2019), online: .
[27] Maria Gavouneli (28 February 2019).
[28] Alexander Betts, 鈥淭he Global Compact on Refugees: Towards a Theory of Change?,鈥 20:20 International Journal of Refugee Law (17 December 2018), pp. 1-4. See also Volker T眉rk and Rebecca Dowd (2014).
[29] Sarah Deardorff Miller (27 February 2019).
[30] Ibid at para 7.
[31] Meltem Ineli-Ciger (20 June 2018).
[32] GCR full text at para. 4.
[33] GCR full text at para. 87.
[34] Jocelyn Perry and Stephanie Schwartz (21 February 2019).
[35] Sarah Deardorff Miller (27 February 2019).
About the author
Rouba Al-Salem was a postdoctoral Steinberg Fellow in International Migration Law and Policy at the CHRLP (2017-2018) and acurrently a researcher affiliated with the Oppenheimer Chair in Public International Law. She holds a PhD in International Law from Universit茅 de Montr茅al and has worked in the field of human rights at the UN and NGO level in the Middle East, including for the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and for the International Organization for Migration. Her current research interests revolve around the resettlement and integration related experience of the Syrian refugee community in Canada.