Incentive mechanism design using linear matrix inequality approach
Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar
Speaker: Pegah Rokh Foroz 鈥� School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Tehran, Iran, and ETH Zurich, Switzerland
Webinar ID: 962 7774 9870
Passcode: 285404
We consider a centralized multi-agent optimization problem with coupling constraint among agents, where the information is distributed between agents who are strategic, selfish and have the private value functions. To achieve a global optimal solution, we propose an incentive mechanism based on a message space and payment function, which makes a non-cooperative game among agents where an individual utility function of each agent aligns with the centralized optimization problem. We construct a family of payment function, which leads to a potential game among agents and ensures the strongly Nash implementation, budget balance and individual rationality of the induced mechanism using the linear matrix inequality approach.
